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Signed into law by President Clinton in 1994,
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act' ("CALEA" or the "Act") was intended
to better define the duties of telecommunications
carriers in assisting law enforcement in administering authorized wiretaps. The Act provided for
industry establishment of technical standards outlining specifications that bring various technologies and services into compliance with CALEA's
assistance capability requirements. 2 Following
years of industry deliberation over the standards,
which were accompanied by protests from law enforcement agencies and privacy advocates, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
the "Commission") issued a report and order
adopting the proposed industry standards along
with several additional features requested by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation

("FBI").

3

The

propriety of the Third Report and Order and the
standards contained within it, are now the subject
of consolidated petitions for review pending in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. 4 Federal wiretap law is thus
experiencing new Fourth Amendment challenges,
in addition to other growing pains accompanying
CALEA implementation, as it expands to cover
more recent telecommunications technologies
and services.
This comment begins with an overview of the
history of federal wiretap law. Then, after an in' Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 and various sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(l), at 18 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3498 (noting the driving forces behind
CALEA); 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1006 (1999) (setting forth assistance capability requirements for telecommunications carriers and the safe harbor provision triggered when carriers
comply with standards adopted by the industry as a whole,

respectively).

troduction to CALEA and its structure, the paper
discusses and analyzes the FCC's 'Third Report and
Order containing the technical standards for assistance capability. Finally, the author advances a series of arguments in favor of upholding the Third
Report and Order.These arguments are designed to
address both the economic concerns of telecommunications industry participants and the potential implications for individual privacy. This comment casts the disputed technical standards as
precisely what Congress intended when it enacted
CALEA: specifications designed to preserve the
ability of law enforcement to carry out authorized
wiretaps in the face of increasingly complex telecommunications technology. The innovative concept of establishing industry standards to achieve
such a purpose will be defended by emphasizing
its implementation of forward-looking design
specifications that, in practice, should perpetuate
the peaceful coexistence and continuing harmonization of individual electronic privacy and legally authorized surveillance technology.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war3
See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 16794 (1999)
[hereinafter Third Report and Order].
4 See Brief of Petitioners United States Telecom Association ("USTA") Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association ("CTIA"), and Center for Democracy and Technology
("CDT"), at 8, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Nos. 99-1442, 99-1466, 99-1475, 99-1523) [hereinafter
USTA Brie].
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rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 5

A likelihood of criminal activity has long been
held to satisfy the "probable cause" requirement
contained in the Fourth Amendment, 6 and law
enforcement agencies would be severely hampered in their crime-fighting efforts were it not
for such leeway. 7 Before the twentieth century,
American courts of law observed the common law
rule that "if the tendered evidence was pertinent,
the method of obtaining it was unimportant."8 In
1914, however, the Supreme Court limited the
practice of unchecked evidence gathering in
Weeks v. United States by adopting what has become known as the exclusionary rule. The rule
states that no evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may be used in court."'
Wiretapping was not considered a search and
seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amend5

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b), (3)(a) (1999) (requiring,
in a wiretap application order, facts tending to show that an
offense is being, has been or is about to be committed; such
an order will be issued only if a judge determines that the
facts establish probable cause that the offense is being, has
been or is about to be committed).
7
According to the House Judiciary Committee: "[l]aw
enforcement officials have consistently testified . . . that

court-authorized electronic surveillance is a critical law enforcement and public safety tool." H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1),
at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63
(1928).
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'0

See id. at 391-92.

I I See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66 (noting that by 1928,
fifty years had passed since the invention of the telephone,
and holding that unauthorized wiretaps installed and monitored without entering the petitioners' homes or office were
neither searches nor seizures within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment). But see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967) (invoking the Fourth Amendment to invalidate a New
York statute allowing the use of electronic eavesdropping in
criminal investigations by law enforcement officers); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that
"[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). Federal prohibition
officers in Olmstead gathered evidence of a conspiracy to import and distribute "intoxicating liquors" in violation of the
National Prohibition Act by inserting wires along telephone
lines leading from petitioners' homes and their "chief office," and transcribing incriminating conversations overheard by the officers. See Olmstead, 227 U.S at 456-57.
12
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (citing Olnstead, 277 U.S.
at 457, 464-66 (noting various authorities that tend to sup-
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ment for the first ninety years after the invention
of the telephone."I The fundamental hurdle for
evidentiary challenges during that time was the
long-held contention that the Fourth Amendment only protected tangible property.'2 Furthermore, the constitutionality of wiretapping was rendered moot (at least temporarily) by Section
6051 1 of the Communications Act of 193414
("Communications Act" or "1934 Act"). This provision made it a federal crime to intercept, disclose or publish the contents of wiretaps unauthorized by the sender of telephone and telegraph
communications.' 5 Even federal law enforcement
agents were held within the coverage of this provision in Nardone v. United States.' 6 Yet the prohibition did not then effectively extend to state law
enforcement or the use of wiretap evidence in
state courts. 17
The landmark Berger and Katz cases, both decided in 1967, definitively changed the landscape
port a real and personal property-oriented reading of
"searches and seizures" and urging construction of the Constitution in light of its literal meaning at the time of its adoption)).
'3
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1999).
14 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
See 47 U.S.C. § 605. The statute then read, in pertinent
15
part, "'no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person.'" Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937) (quoting § 605 of
the Communications Act).
There were two cases bearing this title and both are
16
relevant here. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Both
of the Nardone cases dealt with the same criminal trial in
which federal agents used evidence from wiretaps to gain
convictions under the National Prohibition Act. The issue addressed in the first Supreme Court opinion was whether, in
view of section 605, evidence gathered in this way was admissible in a federal criminal trial. After determining that procuring such evidence by federal agents was illegal, thus rendering the evidence inadmissible, the case was remanded to
the district court. Soon afterward, in the context of another
subsequent appeal, the Second Circuit recast the issue to encompass "every other use of the proscribed evidence." Nardone, 308 U.S. at 339. In its second opinion, the Supreme
Court responded by stating that a trial judge must allow "the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against
him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 341. The Court
also placed upon the government the defensive burden of
demonstrating the independent origin of any allegedly
tainted evidence. See id.
17 The Supreme Court noted in Berger that, by 1967,
some states permitted their law enforcement officials to use
wiretaps under certain conditions defined by statute or in the
state constitution. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 48-49 n.4-5.
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of wiretap law in the United States. Both opinions
brought electronic eavesdropping 8 within the
definition of a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure. 19 These decisions overturned criminal
convictions based on evidence gathered by the illegal use of electronic eavesdropping. 20 In both
cases the Court based its decision on the Fourth
Amendment, probably because Section 605 of the
Communications Act was then limited to telephone and telegraph communications. 2 ' By thus
incorporating electronic eavesdropping into the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court effectively updated the law to reflect the new techno22
logical reality.
Berger and Katz, however, were more than just
"right to privacy" cases. 23 The Berger Court invalidated a New York statute allowing the issue of warrants for "eavesdropping" because the statutory
standards for obtaining a warrant did not meet
the explicit constitutional requirement of "particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." 24 The statute
did not require law enforcement to describe the
sought conversations with particularity. It allowed
eavesdropping to continue for two months under

a single warrant and provided a simple renewal
18 "Eavesdropping" is treated as including any method
used to overhear private conversations. See id. at 51-53. Wiretapping implicitly falls within that definition. See id. at 46. Yet
a survey of state laws in 1967 revealed inconsistent statutory
treatment of wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping devices.
See id. at 47-49.
19 See id. at 51 (holding that "the use of electronic devices
to capture [a conversation is] a 'search' within the meaning
of the [Fourth] Amendment"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (finding
that the government, in listening to and recording petitioner's telephone conversations, had conducted a Fourth
Amendment "search and seizure").
20
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 44-45; Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
21
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 64; Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
22
"The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not
kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge." Berger, 388 U.S. at 49.
23
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy' . . . its protections go further, and often have noth-

ing to do with privacy at all.").
24
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60
(discussing the various shortcomings of the statute).
25
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60.
26
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59 (reviewing "'the procedure of antecedent justification ... that is central to the
Fourth Amendment"' (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 330 (1966))).
27
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 60-62. Appended to Justice
White's lengthy dissent in Berger was an excerpt from a 1967
report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, entitled "The Challenge of

procedure. It did not require termination of surveillance upon seizure of the desired conversation, and it did not require a showing of "exigent
circumstances" to overcome the lack of notice inherent in eavesdropping. 25 While Katz did not address a state eavesdropping statute, that opinion
also focused on the proper procedure for obtaining a warrant and carrying out authorized surveillance. 26 Both decisions addressed law enforcement concerns regarding the difficulty of
investigating organized crime without wiretaps or
electronic eavesdropping techniques.2 7 As Justice
White noted in his Berger dissent, anyone putting a
finger to the wind in 1967 should have noticed
that such law enforcement concerns had gained
enough legitimacy in Congress to inspire federal
legislation capable of undermining the strict requirements for legal electronic surveillance estab28
lished by the Berger majority.
The contemplated federal eavesdropping legislation was ultimately enacted as Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196829 ("1968 Act"). Title III contained the wiretap provisions that remain the core of federal
wiretap law today. 30 While upholding the existing
federal ban on wiretapping and expanding it to
Crime in a Free Society," which classified wiretapping and
eavesdropping as indispensable to fighting organized crime.
See id. app. at 119-29 (White,J, dissenting).Justice White felt
that the electronic surveillance at issue in Bergerwas reasonable under the circumstances and that the Court had improperly used the case as a vehicle for resolving the many issues
raised by official wiretapping and eavesdropping. See id. at
118 (White, J., dissenting). Although no direct mention of
the challenge of investigating organized crime without electronic surveillance was made in Katz, it can be inferred that
the FBI investigation at issue concerned organized crime.
The facts of the case centered on a conviction for participation in a bookmaking conspiracy, after which the petitioner
was compelled to testify under a grant of immunity before a
federal grand jury concerning the charges involved. See Katz,
389 U.S. at 349 n.3. It also appears that the agents in Katz
believed that they were carrying out their investigation in an
entirely legal fashion. See id. at 352, 356 (characterizing the
agents as deliberately abstaining from penetrating the confines of the telephone booth, in reliance on Olmstead).
28
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 112-18 (noting the numerous
bills then before Congress, as well as House and Senate committee hearings contemplating federal wiretap and eavesdropping legislation).
29
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. II, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1999)).
3) See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Petitionfor Expedited Rulemaking, CC Dkt. No.
97-213 at 6 (filed Mar. 27, 1998) [hereinafter DOJ/FBIPetition]. Indeed, the federal wiretap statute is still commonly
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include other forms of electronic eavesdropping, 31 the 1968 Act laid out a uniform procedure
under which electronic eavesdropping would be
authorized and conducted legally by law enforcement. 32 A court order could be issued allowing
the interception of the contents of wire or oral
communications upon a showing of probable
cause that a crime has been, is being or will be
committed, and that "particular communications"
regarding the crime will thereby be acquired.33
The application for the order had to show that
ordinary investigative procedures had failed,
would probably not succeed or would involve too
much danger. 34 Only those crimes listed at Sec3 5
tion 2516 could be investigated in this manner.
Each order had to limit the interception period to
the shortest time necessary for seizure of the desired communication defined in the order. 36 Furthermore, the order had to include a clause directing that the interception of communications
3 7
not authorized for seizure would be minimized.
This "minimization" requirement in Title III
has since been alleged to satisfy the "particularity"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.3 8 At a
minimum, the required showing that normal investigative means are insufficient for a given factual scenario is reminiscent of the "exigent circumstances" required by the Berger Court to
overcome a lack of prior notice. 3 9 Still, the 1968
Act contained requirements that notice of the investigation had to be provided following the termination of the interception period. 41 In addition, prior to any trial in which the contents of
known as "Title Il."
31
The 1968 Act explicitly covered both wire and oral
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1968). "Congress therein defined oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1968).
-2 The Senate Report noted the twin purposes of the
1968 Act: to protect communications privacy and to "delineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66
(1968).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1999).
34
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a), (c).
35 See id. at § 2518(3) (a), (c). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1999) (containing the exclusive list of suspected criminal activity-mostly felonies-for the investigation of which a wire-

tap may be authorized).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
-17 See id. at § 2518(5).
38

See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in

intercepted communications would be introduced as evidence, copies of the application and
authorizing court order were to be provided to
each party. 41 The party against whom the evidence was offered could move to suppress it on
the basis of illegal interception, the insufficiency
of the authorizing order or the failure of the investigating officers to conduct their surveillance
in a manner consistent with the scope of the order.

42

One necessary provision not included in,the
1968 legislation was a means for law enforcement
to compel the cooperation of telephone carriers
that were reluctant or unwilling to lend the necessary technical support for a court-ordered wiretap. 43 This potential oversight was brought to

Congress' attention in 1970 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 44 Shortly
thereafter, Congress added a provision to the statute requiring telephone carriers to provide "all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception"
authorized.

45

Telecommunications technology advanced significantly over the next fifteen years. In an attempt to keep pace with the proliferation of new
services and technologies, Congress responded
with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 198646 ("1986 Act"). This legislation expanded
existing federal wiretap authority to other
nonvoice "electronic communications" not generally accessible to the public. 4 7 Also included was a

new Chapter 121 in Title 18 of the United States
the DigitalAge: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance
Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 72 (1997).
39
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See also S.
Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66.
40
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
41
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).
42
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a).
43 See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3149,

para. 3 (1997).
44 See Application of the United States, 427 F.2d 639,
643-44 (9th Cir. 1970).
45 Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211 (b), 84 Stat. 654 (1970)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)).
46 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (amending
various sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1986 Act]. See S.
Rep. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3556 (adopting Senator Leahy's assessment that existing federal wiretap law was "hopelessly out of date").
47 Under the 1986 Act, "electronic communications" is
defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,

sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelec-
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Code, devoted entirely to "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access." 48 Additionally, Congress decided
to enact a new uniform federal procedure governing the authorization and use of pen registers
and trap-and-trace devices. 49 The use of these de-

vices is not governed by the Fourth Amendment,
and they had been held to be outside the scope of
the 1968 Act because of their inability to intercept
the contents of communications.

50

The 1986 Act

generally prohibited their use, making exceptions
for court-authorized law enforcement actions-a
design similar to the existing uniform scheme covering wiretaps. 5 1 In addition to individual privacy
concerns, Congress' chief objective in enacting
the 1986 Act was to eliminate the "[t]he lack of
clear [legal] standards [governing the privacy of
nonvoice communications that] may expose law
enforcement officers to liability and ...
52
the admissibility of evidence."

endanger

tronic or photooptical system that affects interstate commerce or foreign commerce." 1986 Act, supra note 46, at
§ 101 (a) (6) (C) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (1999)). Excluded from coverage is any interception of electronic communication carried by a "system that is
configured so that such.., communication is readily accessible to the general public." Id. at § 101(b)(4) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1999)).
48
Id. at § 201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-710 (1999)).
49 See id. at § 301 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-27 (1999)). A "pen register" is a device used to record or decode numbers dialed on a telephone by deriving
the outgoing digits from the signals carried over the attached
telephone line (other than any such device used by a telephone carrier for billing purposes). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
(1999). Similarly, a "[trap-and-trace] device" captures that
portion of a telephone signal that identifies the number of
the telephone from which an incoming call originated. See id.
at § 3127(4).
50
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding telephone numbers not protected by Fourth Amendment); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
166-67 (1977) (finding that because pen registers do not
capture the contents of communications they do not "intercept" communications as contemplated by the 1968 Act).
51
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3123. One notable difference
between the wiretap and pen register statutes is that there is
no exclusive list of crimes for which a pen register order may
be issued. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (listing all crimes that may be
subject to investigation by an authorized wiretap).
52
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3559.
55
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as

II.

THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT

("CALEA") 5 3

Recognizing the continued explosion of new
4
telecommunications technology since 1986,'
Congress responded to the widening gap between

legal standards and technological facts by enacting CALEA. 55 In so doing, Congress also achieved
a new paradigm in wiretap and communications
privacy legislation.5 6 Where the 1986 Act had
merely echoed the existing requirement that a
telecommunications carrier must provide any "assistance necessary to accomplish the intercep-

tion,"' 57 CALEA oudines the specific responsibilities of a telecommunications carrier when
confronted by an interception order. 58 The ensuing battle over appropriate technical standards
for industry-wide implementation of the assistance capability requirements set forth in Section

amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 and various sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
54
See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 2 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3492 (discussing the accelerating
"pace of change in technology and in the structure of the
telecommunications industry").
55
See id. (discussing the legal challenges to law enforcement and privacy concerns presented by digital telephony
and the proliferation of wireless telecommunication services
and online transactions).
56
The Act requires the design of all new telecommunications systems to include standard capabilities that, pursuant
to a court order, can enable law enforcement officers to carry
out authorized electronic surveillance with maximum administrative efficiency and minimal cost to the telecommunications carrier. See generally id. at 13-20 (developing the idea of
this built-in surveillance capability as a unified solution to the
tripartite problem of defining the limitations of a telecommunications carrier's duty to assist law enforcement in carrying out a wiretap order, the technical and political challenges
of access faced by law enforcement, and industry concerns
regarding the potential effects of wiretap order compliance
on competition and innovation).
57 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (concerning wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3124(a), (b) (applying substantially the same language to pen registers and
trap-and-trace devices); United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 176-177 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)).
58
See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 16-17 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3496 (discussing law enforcement assistance capabilities to be required of telecommunications carriers by CALEA). See also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1999) (codifying
the discussed assistance capability requirements).
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103 of CALEA 59 has since raised the question of
whether the Congressional mandate was specific
61

enough.

A.

Responsibilities of Telecommunications
Carriers

For purposes of CALEA, the definition of a telecommunications carrier includes any person or
entity that transmits or switches wire or electronic
interstate or foreign communications as a "com-

mon carrier for hire."' 6 1 Congress explicitly intended this definition to include cellular carriers,
personal communications service ("PCS") providers, cable operators, and satellite-based service
providers, as well as local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers and competitive access providers. 62 In addition, the FCC has the authority to
designate future providers of yet-to-be-developed
local telephone exchange technologies and services as "telecommunications carriers" subject to
CALEA.63 Yet information service providers are
specifically excluded from the statutory defini64
tion.
CALEA requires that telecommunications carriers provide authorized law enforcement officers
access to communications contents and identifying information expeditiously, unobtrusively and
§ 1002.
In response to telecommunications industry reluctance to comply voluntarily with CALEA's technical mandates, and responding to the Department ofJustice and FBI
59
60

47 U.S.C.

requests for assistance, the FCC began a series of rulemaking
proceedings under 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b). These FCC actions
will be discussed in later sections of this paper.
61 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (A) (1999). The discussion in the
subsequent text employs the definition of a "common carrier" of wire and radio communications as found in 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(10) (1999). A more basic definition of common carrier
is one who, in providing a service, "holds himself out to serve
indifferently all potential users." Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 20 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3500 (listing various telecommunications
services that the definition was intended to encompass); 47
U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (B) (i) (including "commercial mobile service" providers); 47 U.S.C. § 153(27) (broadly defining "commercial mobile service" to include personal communications
services and any other service employing "a regularly interacting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated control and relay stations... for private one-way or two-way land
mobile radio communications").
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (B) (ii). A more elaborate discussion appears in H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 20-21
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3500-01.
64
See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i); H.R. Rep. No. 103827(I), at 21 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3501 (in-
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from a remote location without enabling access to
any communication not authorized for interception. 65 Carriers do not have to maintain the same
capability for enabling access to private networks. 66 Carriers are not responsible for the
decryption of any communication that is encrypted using either an algorithm not provided by
the carrier or an algorithm that the carrier does
not have the ability to decrypt. 67 On the other

hand, a telecommunications carrier that is a commercial mobile service provider must identify the
carrier providing mobile services to an adjacent
service area when the subject of a CALEA intercept order leaves the original service area and is
"handed off' to the adjacent carrier. 68
All court-ordered law enforcement access to
communications and call-identifying information
must occur simultaneously with transmission unless law enforcement agrees to receive it at another time.6 '- If access to call-identifying information has been authorized under a pen register, or
trap-and-trace device order, no information regarding the physical location of the subscriber
may be provided to law enforcement other than
the telephone number.7 11 Finally, the telecommunications carrier must protect "the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying in- 7,
formation not authorized to be intercepted."
cluding electronic mail and other computer-based online services as examples of "information services").
65
See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The precise definition of "callidentifying information" has been the subject of much controve rsy.
66 See47 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2) (B).
67
See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (3). For example, a communication that has been digitally encoded by the carrier for
transmission must be converted back into a discernible analog voice signal for interception, but the carrier does not
have to decode communication scrambled independently by
one of the parties to a conversation.
68 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(d). This situation most often occurs in conversations on cellular or PCS telephones while
driving a car. When a phone-chatting driver leaves a mobile
carrier's service area, that carrier will no longer have access
to the driver's communication. CALEA requires that if the
communication is subject to an intercept order, the assisting
carrier must provide the identity of the new carrier whose
service area the driver has entered. See also H.R. Rep. No.
103-827(I), at 24 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3504.
69
See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1), (2)(A).
70
See47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2).
71
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (4) (A). See also 47 U.S.C. § 1004
(Section 105 of CALEA). "[C]arriers must ensure that the
policies and procedures which they establish .. . (1) require

appropriate authorization to activate interception of communications or access to call-identifying information; and (2)
prevent any such interception or access without such authori-
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Although it may be difficult to imagine a law enforcement agency informing a court that violations of this last mandate have occurred, any sustained failure to comply with CALEA could result
in civil penalties to the carrier of $10,000 per
day.

B.

72

Developing Technical Standards for
Implementation

Just as Congress charged the telecommunications industry with ensuring the privacy of its own
networks, it also delegated the initial determination of technical standards for compliance with
CALEA to industry participants. 73 In creating a

safe harbor provision that allowed carriers to comply with the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA simply by meeting the accepted industry
standard, Congress hoped to encourage efficient
implementation of those requirements.7 4 Telecommunications carriers and equipment manufacturers, under the auspices of the Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA"), thus
75
began to craft these technical standards in 1995.
The development of the standards so far has been
concerned primarily with wireline, cellular and
zation." In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-

ment Act, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4151, at para. 20
(1999) (setting forth minimum system security and integrity
requirements for compliance with Section 105 of CALEA)
[hereinafter First Report and Order].
72
The carrier must not only fail to comply with the requirements of CALEA, but there must also be no other reasonably available access to the communication (such as another carrier). See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(a); 47 U.S.C.
§ 1007(a)(1). In addition, compliance must be reasonably
achievable using available technology. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 1007(a) (2). The court issuing the surveillance order must
then order the carrier to make the necessary modifications to
achieve compliance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(a). Fines may only
be imposed for violations of modification orders. The court
must consider good faith efforts by the carrier to comply and
any unreasonable effect that compliance may have on the
carrier's ability to do business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(c) (1); 47
U.S.C. § 1007(b).
73 See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (2).
(a) Safe harbor . . . (2) Compliance under accepted

standards-A telecommunications carrier shall be found
to be in compliance with the assistance capability requirements under [S]ection 1002 ...if the carrier... is

in compliance with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry association or
standard-setting organization . . . to meet the require-

ments of [S]ection 1002."
Id.
74 See,47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1)-(2). This safe harbor provision does not allow a carrier to avoid the requirements of 47
U.S.C. § 1002 in the absence of accepted technical standards.

broadband PCS carrier compliance. At first, suggestions from law enforcement agencies were wel76
come.
In 1997, the TIA submitted its draft standard

for balloting with the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI")." 7 However, the draft
standard was voted down with unanimous opposition from law enforcement. 78 Attached to the
FBI's ballot was a list of eleven technical capabilities not included in the industry's draft standard
that the FBI believed to be mandated by
CALEA. 7 9 Later reduced to nine items, this list became known as the FBI "punch list."80 After a few
revisions to the standard, none of which included
punch list items, the TIA decided to circumvent
ANSI and another law enforcement veto by reballoting the revised draft standard under its own
procedures as an "interim standard."8' 1 Following
unanimous approval of the interim standard by
82
industry ballots, the TIA and Committee T1
jointly published interim standard J-STD-025,
Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (the
'3-standard"). TIA and Committee TI then
adopted it as the accepted standard defining technical services, features and interfaces to satisfy the

See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (3).
75
See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3149, at
para. 44 (1997) [hereinafter CALEA NPRM]. See also USTA
Brief supra note 4.
76
See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
22632, at para. 11 (1998) [hereinafter FNPRM].
77 See id. at para. 12. Industry members, law enforcement
agencies and any other interested parties could participate in
balloting. See id. at n.28.
78

See id.

See id. at para. 12-13.
See id. at para. 13. The two items removed from the list
were "standardized delivery interface" and "separated delivery," limiting the number of delivery interfaces and requiring
separate delivery of information for each participant in a
conference call, respectively. Id. at para. 13 n.30. The Department of Justice apparently conceded that neither of these
items was mandated by CALEA. See id. The nine remaining
items, further discussed below in this paper, are: 1) content
of subject-initiated conference calls; 2) party hold, join and
drop on conference calls; 3) subject-initiated dialing and signaling; 4) in-band and out-of-band signaling; 5) timing information; 6) surveillance status; 7) continuity check tone; 8)
feature status; and 9) dialed digit extraction.
81 According to ANSI procedures, an interim standard is
a "trial use" standard valid for only three years. See id. at para.
14.
82
Committee Ti is the wireline standards-setting body
sponsored by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
Solutions. See id. at para. 14 n.35, para. 15.
79
80
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safe harbor provisions of CALEA. 83
Appreciating the likelihood of such a disagreement occurring between law enforcement and the
telecommunications industry, Congress explicitly
provided for mediation in the form of an FCC ruling upon the petition of "a Government agency or
any other person [who] believes that [the
' 4
adopted industry] standards are deficient."
Among the petitions for rulemaking filed with the
5
Commission under Section 107(b) of the Act
was one filed jointly by the FBI and the Department ofJustice ("DOJ"). 6 While the DOJIFBIPetition generally lamented the under-inclusiveness of
the J-standard, another petition for rulemaking
filed one day earlier by the Center for Democracy
and Technology ("CDT") maintained that the
standard was over-inclusive and that compliance
with it was not reasonably achievable. 8 7 Closing
the triangle was a petition filed by the TIA, asking
the Commission to resolve the dispute over the Jstandard's completeness. TIA also asked the Commission to establish a permanent standard on an
expedited basis and to "remand any further technical standardization work to TIA."8 8 The Commission responded with a FurtherNotice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("FNPRM') under its rulemaking authority granted by sections 107(b) and 301 (a) of
CALEA. 9 In its FNPRM, the Commission made
tentative conclusions regarding whether two contested features of the J-standard and the nine
punch list items each satisfied the assistance capability requirements of the Act. 90 It further stated
that the uncontested technical requirements of
the J-standard were "beyond the scope of this proceeding," and that any necessary modifications to
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the J-standard made by the Commission should be
implemented by TIA. 9 1 Finally, the FNPRM also
sought opinions regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase "reasonably available" as it pertained to call-identifying information delivered
under intercept authority authorized by Section
103.92
III.

THIRD REPORT AND ORDER

At the end of August 1999, the Commission released its Third Report and OrdeP3 that set out technical standards for compliance with CALEA's assistance capability requirements. 9 4 In addressing
the concerns of numerous groups regarding the
issues discussed in the FNPRM, the Third Report
and Order essentially adopted the J-standard plus
six of the nine punch list items requested by the
FBI. 9 5 The Commission also therein defined "reasonably available" to refer to call-identifying information that is "present at an lAP and can be made
available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications." 96
A.

Location Information

One of the most hotly debated features of the Jstandard is its inclusion of location information
that, if available at a given LAP, can provide the
"mobile terminal" location being used by the subject of the intercept order.9 7 In this regard, the
Third Report and Orderrefers specifically to the statutory definition of "call-identifying information,"
which includes information identifying the origin,
direction, destination or termination of a commu-

See id. at para. 15.
47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
47 U.S.C. § 1006.
See DOJ/FBIPetition, supra note 30.
See FNPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 18-19.
Id. at para. 20.
See id. at para. 23. Sections 107(b) and 301 (a) are codi-

ers. See id.
95
See id.
96 Id. at para. 29. An "IAP"-intercept access point-is
defined in the J-standard as "a point within a telecommunication system where some of the communications or call-identifying information of an intercept subject's equipment, facili-

fied at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1006(b) and 229(a), respectively. The

025 § 4.2.2). In other words, it is the physical point at which
the line is tapped, which is usually a switch. See id. at para. 28
n.65. The J-standard more narrowly defines "reasonably available" as "present at an intercept access point for call processing
purposes." Id. at para. 28 (emphasis added) (citing J-STD-025
§ 4.2.1.).

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

former provision authorizes rulemaking specifically in response to petitions for rulemaking filed under 47 U.S.C.
§ 1006(b). The latter authorizes the Commission to "prescribe such rules as are necessary to implement the requirements of CALEA." 47 U.S.C. § 229(a).
90 See ENPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 24.

ties and services are accessed." Id. at para. 14 (quotingJ-STD-

97

See id. at para. 37. The approval of this feature of the J-

standard is one of the primary issues presented by the USTA,

92

Id. at para. 45, 132-33.
See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).

93

Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 16794.

Report and Order. At publication this appeal was pending in

94

See id. at para. 1. The standards adopted in the Third

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See USTA Brief supra note 4.

91

Report and Orderonly apply to wireline, cellular and PCS carri-

CTIA and CDT in their petition for review of the FCC's Third
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nication. 98 The Commission determined that the
Act mandates the inclusion of certain location information as call identifying because it includes
"origin" and "destination" in the statutory definition of call-identifying information. 99 The Commission limited such location information to cell
site identification with regard to wireless communications, drawing an analogy to street address information already available to law enforcement
for wireline telephone numbers. 10 0 In response to
CALEA's provision limiting location information
acquired under pen register or trap-and-trace authority to "what may be determined from the telephone number," 10 1 the Commission adopted the
DOJ/FBI position that this provision does not entirely preclude location information from being
"call-identifying information." Rather, the authorization requirements for law enforcement to gain
access to such information are much stricter than
those imposed on pen register and trap-and-trace
02
device authorization. 1

B.

Packet-Mode Communication Contents

The second contested feature of the J-standard
is its failure to define a technical standard for separating the contents of packet-mode communications from the "call-identifying information" that
would theoretically be available to law enforcement even under pen register authority. 10 3 Such
an omission could presumably make the entire
communication accessible to law enforcement re10 4
gardless of the level of authorized surveillance.
98 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2)).
99
100

See id.
See id. at para. 44-45.

101

47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).

102

See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44.
"Packet-mode" refers to "a communication where in-

103

dividual packets or virtual circuits of a communication within
a physical circuit are switched or routed by the accessing telecommunication system. Each packet may take a different
route through the intervening network(s)." Id. at para. 47

n.97 (quoting J-STD-025 § 3.). Some examples of packetmode services are Integrated Services Digital Network
("ISDN"), Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA"), Time
Division Multiple Access ("TDMA"), Asynchronous Transfer
Mode ("ATM") and Internet Protocol ("IP") services. See id.
at para. 55 n.106. Traditional local wireline telephone service, where the entire two-way communication passes
through the same path, is described as "circuit-mode." See id.
at para. 47 n.97.
The issue of separating packet-mode communication contents from identifying information will continue to be de-

Recognizing the difficulty of defining any uniform assistance capability standard for the numerous existing packet-mode technologies, particularly given their rapidly evolving nature, the
Commission requested that TIA further study the
matter and report its findings by September 30,
2000.105 The Commission then adopted the ex-

isting J-standard as an interim standard, potentially making available to law enforcement both
call contents and call-identifying information
under the authority required for a pen register by
September 30, 2001.106

C.

FBI Punch List

The Commission's FNPRM tentatively addressed nine punch list items that the DOJ and
FBI believe are mandated by CALEA but were not
addressed in the J-standard.1° 7 In the Third Report
and Order, five of the punch list items were held to
be within the scope of CALEA's definition of "callidentifying information" (at least under certain
circumstances) and thus included in the assistance capability requirements of Section 103.108
These five items are (as further discussed below)
information regarding: 1) party hold, join and
drop on conference calls; 2) subject-initiated dialing and signaling; 3) in-band and out-of-band signaling; 4) call timing; and 5) dialed digit extraction (or "post-cut-through" digits). 10 9 Another of
the punch list items (contents of subject-initiated
conference calls) was defined as a communication
"to or from the equipment, facilities, or services of
bated as the capability to intercept digital communications is
contemplated by the new Ch. 9 in Tit. 47 of the United States
Code, "Interception of Digital and Other Communications."
Furthermore, there is a growing industry consensus that telecommunications networks as a whole are moving toward
packet-based architecture. See id. at para. 51-53.
104 See id. at para. 53 (noting the complete lack of feasibility of monitoring individual packet data streams).
105
106

See id. at para. 55-56.

See id. In supporting its ruling, the Commission assigned greater weight to the cost-minimization and innovation-encouraging factors of 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1)-(5) (listing factors to be considered by the Commission when
exercising its rulemaking authority) than it did to the privacy-protection factor. The Commission noted "independent
legal barriers" that existed to using illegally obtained communications in court proceedings. See Third Report and Order, 14
FCC Rcd. at para. 56 (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518.).
107 See FNPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 13, 32.
108 See Third Report and Order,14 FCC Rcd. at para. 74, 82,
89, 95, 119.
109 See id.
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a subscriber" and thus an authorized interception
under CALEA.1 10 By contrast, the Commission rejected requirements for continuity check tones
and the provision of surveillance and feature status information, which were the remaining three
punch list items requested by the FBI. The Commission rejected these requirements because it
held that they fell outside the Act's specific mandate.'"
1. Content of Subject-Initiated Conference Calls
The Commission adopted a practical approach
to this FBI punch list item: it interpreted CALEA
to allow the authorized surveillance of all conference call contents reasonably available at the intercept access point ("LAP") from which the subject is monitored. 12 Citing provisions of CALEA
Section 103 pertaining to "mobile service assistance requirements," however, the Commission
concluded that a separate order would be required to enable law enforcement agencies to
gain full access to contents of subject-initiated
conference calls supported by the services of a remote carrier. 1 The Third Report and Order does
not require carriers to provide law enforcement
with access to conference communications that
are not available on the carriers' own equip-
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2. Party Hold, Join and Drop On Conference Calls
This second punch list item refers to a network
signal generated by the equipment or service hosting a conference call. It effectively identifies individual parties as each connects to and disconnects
from a conference call, or when one or more conference call participants are put on hold. 1 6 Although such signals are not currently available
everywhere, the Commission determined that
they were "call-identifying information" within the
scope of Section 103 and thus required if the conference call uses the carrier's facilities, equipment
or services. 11 The Commission held that "party
join" and "party drop" signals identified the origin
and termination of a communication, respectively, bringing both signals within the scope of
CALEA section 102.111 On the other hand, the
Commission found that "party hold" signals were
information regarding the "temporary origin,
temporary termination, or re-direction of a communication."" 19 The Commission determined that
access to "party hold" signals, as a group, was necessary for law enforcement to monitor accurately
the contribution to a conference call made by the
subject of a wiretap order, as well as to minimize
interception of communications not involving the
20

subject. 1

ment. 11 4 Nor is any carrier required to provide

law enforcement with access to conference call
conversations that continue after the subject has
terminated his or her connection-regardless of
1 5
the service supporting the communication.
110
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1). See Third Report and Order, 14
FCC Rcd. at para. 64, 66.
111 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 101,
106, 111.
112
See id. at para. 66-67. So long as the conference call is
hosted by the telecommunications carrier to which the wiretap subject subscribes, law enforcement can monitor the con-

tents of conversations among other parties to the conference
call even if the wiretap subject puts the conference call on

hold. See id. at para. 66. Therefore, if the conference call is
hosted by another carrier's equipment, only those portions
of the call in which the subject is participating will be accessi-

ble at the LAP. This may become relevant if the subject does
not initiate the conference call or if the "conference bridge"
for a subject-initiated conference call is located remotely-as

is possible with some on-demand conference services. See id.
at para. 67. Here, the Commission's refusal to require that a
carrier's assistance continue after the communication has
been given to another carrier is consistent with its treatment
of wireless communications assistance when a wiretap subject

has left the carrier's service area. See discussion supra note 68.
See id. at para. 67 n.128 (citing 47 U.S.C.
11

3. Subject-Initiated Dialingand Signaling
When the subject of law enforcement surveillance activates carrier-provided service features
§§ 1002(a)(1), (d)).
115

See id. at para. 67.
See id. at para. 67 n. 129.

116

See id. at para. 68.

114

See id. at para. 75. The Commission found that party
hold, join and drop signals were "reasonably available" within
the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2). The Commission
thus required the hosting carrier to provide law enforcement
access to these signals, even in situations where these signals
are not currently generated. See id. Presumably, this access
includes services provided by a carrier's subcontractors. See
id. at para. 71 (recognizing that Bell Atlantic raised this issue). However, no such network signals are required if the
conference services are provided by equipment located on a
customer's premises because no signals are generated by the
75.
carrier's network itself. See id. at para.
118 Seeid. atpara. 74. See also4 7 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (including in the definition of "call-identifying information" signals
that identify "the origin ... or termination" of a communication).
119 Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 74.
120
See id.
117
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such as call hold, call transfer, call forwarding, call
waiting, or adding and dropping parties to a conference call, the Commission has held that notification of such activation is "call-identifying information" mandated by the assistance capability
requirements of CALEA. 21 These signals can be
distinguished from party hold, join and drop signals because they only cover functions initiated by
a surveillance subject and include services used in
conjunction with nonconference calls.1 22 Like
party hold, join and drop signals, these signals
were held by the Commission to identify the origin, direction, destination or termination of a call.
The Commission, therefore, requires that carriers
provide law enforcement with access to these signals because they are necessary for law enforcement to associate other call-identifying information with the correct communication.1 23 However,

subject-initiated dialing and signaling is not "readily available" to a carrier if processed by equipment located on a customer's premises, which
means that the production of such privately gen124
erated information cannot be compelled.
4.

voice mail notification, busy signal and ringing
tone-pass through the LAP, they are "readily
available" and thus required for law enforcement
access under CALEA Section 103.126 As with party
hold, join and drop, and subject-initiated dialing
and signaling, any signal generated on-premises
by customer equipment is not "reasonably available" and thus is not a required law enforcement
1 27
assistance capability.
5.

Timing Information

The Third Report and Order imposes a requirement on telecommunications carriers for time
stamps on all transmissions to law enforcement
agencies delivered pursuant to an interception order.' 2 The, Commission considered the time
stamp itself to be "call-identifying information"
within the meaning of both sections 102 and 103
of CALEA.

129

Furthermore, the Commission es-

tablished a maximum delivery time of eight
seconds for call-identifying information, beginning when the information is received at the
IAP. 130

In-Band and Out-of-Band Signaling

6.

Surveillance Status

The Commission found some in-band and outof-band signaling to be included in the CALEA
1 25
definition of "call-identifying information."
Therefore, to the extent that such signals sent by
the carrier's equipment or services to the subscriber-such as call waiting notification, new

Periodic surveillance status information, which
would theoretically include updated wiretap activity and functionality data, was held by the Commission to be outside of the scope of necessary as3
sistance capability requirements under CALEA.1 1

121
See id. at para. 82. The Commission found that subject-initiated dialing and signaling, including dialed digits,
depressed or released on-hook buttons and use of flash buttons, were "reasonably available" to the extent that these signals were processed at the IAP. See id.
122
See id. at para. 81. Party hold, join and drop signals
(as referenced in the second punch list item) contain information relating to all parties to a conference call-not just
the subject of a wiretap order. Subject-initiated dialing and
signaling, while containing some overlapping information,
focuses instead on all signals generated only by the subject of
a wiretap order, whether or not he or she is in a conference
call. See id. (discussing the DOJ/FBI reply comments to BellSouth's suggestion that information from such signals would
be redundant).
123 See id. at 82 (referring to 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (2) (defining "call-identifying information") and 1002(a) (2) (B) (identifying capability requirement for associating call-identifying
information with call content)). An example presented in
the Third Report and Order features a hypothetical law enforcement officer becoming confused as to which communication
matches which call-identification information when a subject
activates his or her call waiting in order to answer another
call. See id.

124
See discussion supra note 117. See also Third Report and
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 82.
125
See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 89.
The Commission supported this finding by noting that such
signaling indicates "information about the termination of a
call." Id.
126
See id. Although most of the examples given in the
Third Report and Orderare signals that would be audible to the
subject, in-band and out-of-band signaling also includes
nonaudible signals, such as remotely activated telephone
message lights or text messages. See id. at para. 83. Signals
that do not result in a message to the subscriber are not "callidentifying information." See id.
127
See id.
128
See id. at para. 95.
129
See id. (bringing a time stamp within range of the Section 102 definition of "call-identifying information" and noting its necessity in associating the call-identifying information
with the underlying communication).
130
See id. at para. 96. Transmission to law enforcement
must occur "within eight seconds 95% of the time." Id.
131
See id. at paras. 97, 101. Paragraph 97 of the Third
Report and Order describes functions requested under the
heading of "surveillance status" as including "the date, time
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Apart from the fact that carriers do not currently
generate this information, and it is entirely separate from any existing communications or signals
that could be intercepted legally, the Commission
concluded that surveillance status information
' 132
was not itself "call-identifying information.'
7. Continuity Check Tone
A continuity check tone, as requested by the
FBI, consists of a dial tone transmitted over a call
content channel to a law enforcement agency
whenever the wiretap subject's telecommunications medium (subject to the intercept order) is
not in use. 3 3 The Commission attempted to distinguish this tone from surveillance status information on the basis that a continuity check tone
effectively only notifies carriers and law enforcement agencies when an active call occurs. However, it used essentially the same reasoning to exclude both features from the assistance capability
13
mandates of CALEA.
8. Feature Status
Feature status was the third punch list feature
held to be outside the scope of CALEA's assistance capability mandates.1

35

The Commission de-

fined feature status information as notification of
certain modifications to the wiretap subject's calling service subscriptions.1 3

6

Although it noted

that such information can be obtained from existing records by sending a subpoena to a carrier,
the Commission determined that feature status
messages were neither "call-identifying information" nor communications, and thus excluded
these messages from the requirements of CALEA
Section 103.137
and location of the wiretap; identification of the subscriber
whose facilities are under surveillance; and identification of

all voice channels that are connected to the subscriber." Id. at
para. 97.
132

See id. at para. 101.

133

See id. at para. 102.

134

See id. at paras. 102 n.197, 106 (contrasting the con-

tinuity check tone from surveillance status information and
defining the relevant scope of the latter as whether the wiretap is operational).
135
136

See id. at para. 111.

See id. at para. 107. Examples include the addition or

deletion of such service capabilities as call waiting and conference calling, as well as a change of telephone number or

disconnection of service. See id.
137 See id. at para. 111.
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9. Dialed Digit Extraction
The Commission wrestled with the versatile utility of digits dialed after an initial call connection
(often referred to as "post-cut-through digits"1 38 )
in the Third Report and Order in an attempt to delineate the characteristics of digits comprising call
content and those which merely route the call to
its destination. 3 9 At odds were the necessity of access to digits dialed after the initial connection to
a long-distance carrier using a toll free access
number, and the privacy interest in digits dialed
for purposes of conducting a telephone banking
transaction or using a credit card to order merchandise. 140 The privacy issue was treated in the
Third Report and Orderas subordinate to the cost of
developing technology capable of distinguishing
the two types of post-cut-through digits. Thus, the
Commission responded in a manner consistent
with its disposition toward packet-mode communications and found that delivery of all post-cutthrough digits is an assistance capability requirement of CALEA Section 103.141 The practical effect of this conclusion is that all post-cut-through
digits will be accessible to law enforcement agencies conducting surveillance under the authority
of a pen register order. 14 2 As with packet-mode
communications, the Third Report and Order appears to leave the privacy of post-cut-through digits (at least temporarily) in the hands of intercepting law enforcement agencies restrained only
by a minimization requirement and the exclusion143
ary rule.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Commission's Third Report and Order conveys an intention to preserve the status quo for
Id. at para. 112.
See id. at para. 119-123.
140
See id. at para. 119. The Commission held that postcut-through digits dialed for call-routing purposes were callidentifying information. See id. Other post-cut-through digits,
such as credit card and bank account numbers, are considered call content and thus meriting additional constitutional
protection. See id. at para. 114 (discussing comments of EFF,
EPIC and ACLU). While the former is legally accessible
under pen register authority, the latter, if treated as call content, should not be accessible. See id.
141
See id. at para. 123.
142
See id.
143
See id. See also discussion supra notes 9-10 (introducing Weeks and the exclusionary rule).
138

139

CALEA Telecommunication Standards

20001

law enforcement while strictly construing the lan-

guage of CALEA so as to minimize its economic
impact on the telecommunications industry. Indeed, the Third Report and Orderleaves intact the Jstandard developed by industry participants. Assuming that developers of the J-standard had their
own economic interests in mind, the cost to industry of implementing CALEA should be minimized. Of course, this is not to say that the unsubsidized cost of CALEA implementation will be
small.

144

Moreover, the additional technical capability
requirements defined by the Third Report and Order were selected carefully to conform to existing
J-standard features as closely as possible without
depriving law enforcement agencies of traditionally available electronic surveillance capabilities. 145 This view of the Commission's action compels the conclusion that it satisfied two of the
three major policies behind CALEA. Those policies are: "(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect pri144 The high estimate of the total industry cost for implementation of the J-standard without any punch list features
exceeds $4 billion. See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at
para. 20 (referring to the Cellular Telecommunication Industry Association's estimate). Aggregate revenue' estimates
by five major telecommunications equipment manufacturers,
on the other hand, total $916 million for the core J-standard
and an additional $414 million for all nine punch list items.
See id. at para. 30, app. B (breaking down manufacturers' cost
estimates by punch list item and distinguishing between wireline and wireless service equipment). Of the total cost, Congress initially authorized $500 million for appropriation during fiscal years 1995 through 1998 to compensate certain
qualifying carriers that comply with the assistance capability
requirements. See 47 U.S.C. § 1009 (1994). Only $60 million
was appropriated directly during that period. See Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). This appropriation amount was
primarily because of implementation delays. See 144 CONG.
REc. S12,852-02, S12,857 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Leahy). Congress has directly appropriated an additional $15 million for fiscal year 2000. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-4 (1999). There are essentially two ways that a carier
may qualify for compensation from the Attorney General 'for
the carrier's CALEA compliance costs. One way, to qualify is
by making necessary modifications "in connection with
equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or
before January 1, 1995." 47 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (1994). The
other way to qualify for compensation (concerning modifications to "equipment, facilities, and services installed or
deployed after January 1, 1995") is for the carrier to: 1) petition the Commission for a determination of whether compliance is "reasonably achievable" by the carrier, considering
"whether compliance would impose significant difficulty or
expense on the carrier or on the users of the carrier's sys-

vacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid
impeding the development of new communications services and technologies."1 46 It was the
Commission's supposed failure to refrain from effectively making "a broad range of private information"'14 7 available to law enforcement surveil-

lance that inspired the arguments against CALEA
implementation made by industry and civil liberties groups in their consolidated appeal of the
14 8
Third Report and Order.

A. Petition for Review of the Third Report and
Order
Following the FCC's adoption of the Third Report and Order in August 1999, two industry associations and three civil liberties groups filed petitions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
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The Elec-

tronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit that was subsequently transferred to the D.C. Circuit. 150 After
tems"; and then 2) apply to the Attorney General for compensation, assuming a Commission determination that compliance is not reasonably achievable. Id. at § 1008(b).
145
See, e.g., discussion supra notes 103-106, 138-143 (discussing interception of packet-mode communications and
post-cut-through digits). Rather than imposing prohibitive
costs on the industry by requiing development of new' surveillance technology usable only by law enforcement or depriving law enforcement of all access to communications previously available for three decades, the Commission split the
difference and adopted the "readily available" technology.
Also note the Commission's readiness to define "reasonably
available" as available at the LAP. The inference here is that
the Commission has done everything in its power to accommodate industry demands for the least expensive CALEA implementation possible.
146
H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493.
147
USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 11.
148
See id. at 2 (noting that two of three issues presented
for review focus on propriety of ordering overinclusive technical standards-that is, providing more information than
previously available under wiretap authority); Brief of Petitioners Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") and the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") at 1, United States Telecom Ass'n
v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Nos. 99-1442, 99-1466, 99-1475, 991,523) (noting that three issues presented for review question
FCC propriety of ordering overinclusive standards and the
fourth questions whether the order directly violates the
Fourth Amendment) [hereinafter EPIC Brief].
149 The industry groups are the USTA and CTIA. The
civil liberties groups are EPIC, ACLU and CDT. See USTA
Brief supra note 4, at 2; EPIC Brief supra note 148.
150
See EPIC Brief supra note 148.
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consolidating these initial petitions, three more
industry groups and three telecommunications
15
companies intervened in the action. '
The main concern of the petitioners' briefs is
privacy protection. However, each argument turns
on whether the Commission overstepped its authority, or acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when it promulgated technical standards
for CALEA implementation in the Third Report
and Order.' 52 The first assistance capability holding challenged by petitioners is the Third Report
and Order's conclusion that cell location at the beginning and end of a wireless telephone call is
"call-idenifying information" and therefore must
be made available to law enforcement.

153

The pe-

titioners put great emphasis on the danger that
disclosing such information poses to individual
privacy, characterizing the potential use of such
information as physical location tracking. 15 4 Despite a plausible construction of the statutory definition of "call-identifying information," however,
the petitioners fail to address the Commission's
argument that this capability preserves the electronic surveillance status quo. 155 Because law enforcement generally has access to the location associated with a wireline telephone number, the
Commission reasoned that providing the cell site
location for mobile communication interception
neither expands nor contracts existing electronic
surveillance authority. 156
Congress apparently envisioned this potential
gray area when it added a provision to CALEA
151
The intervening industry groups are the Personal
Communications Industry Association ("PCIA"), the Rural
Cellular Association ("RCA") and the Telecommunications
Industry Association ("TIA"). Companies intervening as of

Jan. 20, 2000 (the filing date of the petitioners' briefs) are
AirTouch Communications, Inc., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. and

U.S. West, Inc. See id. at iv. Note that many of the intervenors
are concerned specifically with mobile telecommunications

services.

152
See id. at 2; USTA Brief supra note 4, at 11. Privacy
protection concerns, as referenced in the accompanying text,

include both Title Ill and Fourth Amendment violations.
Many of the arguments made in both briefs use privacy concerns as bases for concluding that the Commission exceeded
its authority under CALEA.
153 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 18; EPIC Brief, supra
note 148, at 16.
154
See USIA Brief supra note 4, at 21 (referring to cell
location information as enabling "law enforcement officials
to monitor a person's location in near real-time"). Yet the
Commission explicitly stated that it would require no such
capability. See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 46.
155 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 19-20 (construing the
definition of "call-identifying information" in 47 U.S.C.
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that denies law enforcement access to physical location information using trap-and-trace device authority. 157 Yet allowing suspects to prevent effective disclosure of their locations merely by using
mobile rather than wireline telephones cannot be
what Congress intended when it sought to preserve law enforcement's existing electronic surveillance capabilities. -58 The Commission straddled the fence as best it could on this issue. First,
it required that mobile telecommunications carriers develop the ability to provide cell site location.
Second, the Commission held that such information could not be accessed by law enforcement
under trap-and-trace device authority alone.1 5 9 In
its role as "a forum . . . in the event a dispute
arises over the technical requirements,"1 60 the
Commission balanced three congressional purposes for enacting CALEA. Privacy protection,
surveillance capability preservation and minimization of any hindrance to technological innovation
received equal consideration. Despite petitioners'
arguments to the contrary, a different interpretation of "call-identifying information" with respect
to cell site location would have compromised one
or more of the driving forces behind CALEA's enactment and would have taken the Commission
161
beyond its authority as created under the Act.
In addition to physical location information,
the petitioners also challenge the four punch list
features dealing with post-connection dialing and
signaling that the Commission adopted in the
Third Report and Order.162 The petitioners' chief
§ 1001 (2) as limited to telephone numbers only).
156

See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 45.

Law enforcement agencies have previously had access to the
location of a wireline telephone either from their own 911
databases or from a telephone carrier's records. See id.
157 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).
158
See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(l), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493 (stating an intention to preserve a
"capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts").
159

See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44.

Most mobile carriers apparently contemplated providing
such information, as this capability is included in the J-standard. See id. at para. 45.
160

H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 27 (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3507.
. '(',

See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 11. Petitioners argue

that the Third Report and Order conflicts with the purpose of
CALEA in this regard and offer little reasoning to support
their conclusions. See id.
162
See id. at 22-27. These four contested punch list features are: dialed digit extraction; party hold, join and dropon conference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signaling;
and in-band and out-of-band signaling. See id.
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concern is that some of this information can be
considered call content and thus could be subject
1 63
to Fourth Amendment privacy protections.
This concern really applies only to dialed digit extraction. In fact, the petitioners' only appropriate
argument against mandating law enforcement access to the other contested punch list features
seems to be that these features should not be considered "call-identifying information" within the
meaning of CALEA.164
It is unclear why this should be the case, notwithstanding the petitioners' careful construction
of the Act's statutory language and legislative history in their briefs. Petitioners offer no compelling policy reason to support their implication
that, in an age of versatile telecommunications
services, law enforcement agencies acting under
proper court-ordered wiretap authorization
should not receive information necessary to
match call-identifying information with call content. 165 Even if the four challenged punch list
items are not construed as call-identifying features, they would allow law enforcement agencies
acting under pen register or trap-and-trace device
authority to make sense of the telephone number
information received during electronic surveillance. Suppose, for example, that an intercept
subject hosts a conference call with multiple participants. At best, a pen register would capture
only those digits dialed by the subject who set up
the conference call. Meanwhile, a trap-and-trace
device might capture the phone numbers of other
parties joining the call or, at least, the phone
number of the facility hosting the conference call.
Without additional information provided by telecommunications carriers to law enforcement
agencies, these numbers captured by electronic
surveillance would be difficult or impossible to
understand. 166
Compare this example to what was once the

only possible situation facing law enforcement in
electronic surveillance. One single telephone dialed a connection request to another single telephone, and the only numbers with any significance to the call were those dialed prior to
connection. 167 Law enforcement agencies gath-

ered this information using pen registers or trapand-trace devices for the express purpose of identifying "the associates and confederates of those
believed to be conducting the illegal operation."' 6 That identification often is no longer
possible without the additional information contained in party hold,join and drop signals on conference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signaling; and in-band and out-of-band signaling. Thus
the Commission had no real choice but to include
this information within the scope of "call-identifying information" under CALEA. Otherwise, the
Commission would have failed to preserve the status quo of electronic surveillance capability for
law enforcement agencies acting under pen register or trap-and-trace device authority.16'7

The petitioners make a stronger case against
the adoption of dialed digit extraction as a technical requirement in the Third Report and Order.
While the other three punch list items contested
by the petitioners cover information regarding
changes in the status of an intercept subject's
communication or changes in the identities of
other parties to the call, dialed digit extraction includes all numbers dialed after the initial call has
been connected. 170 The petitioners argue that requiring carriers to provide this information runs
afoul of both the Fourth Amendment and Title
III because the numbers dialed are often credit
card numbers, bank account numbers or passwords, all of which are properly considered call
content. 1 7 1 They suggest that as "call-identifying

information" pursuant to the Third Report and Order, these numbers would have to be made availa-

See EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 11-12.
See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 24-27.
165
CALEA, in fact, requires that authorized access to
call-identifying information should be provided by telecommunications carriers to law enforcement agencies "in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to
which it pertains." 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2) (B).
166 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 12-13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3492-93. The House Report ac-

167
See id. at 13 ("[U]ntil recently, the question of system
design was never an issue for authorized surveillance").
168 New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
169
See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at paras. 74,

companying CALEA specifically mentioned call forwarding, a

agencies conducting electronic surveillance to know who is
talking to whom. See id.
170
See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 22.
171
See id.

163

164

service feature included in the "subject-initiated dialing and
signaling information" punch list item, as an impediment to
authorized wiretaps. Id.

82, 89 (finding party hold,join and drop on conference calls;
subject-initiated dialing and signaling information; and inband and out-of-band signaling to be call-identifying information). These paragraphs also hold that the first two of the
three items listed here are necessary for law enforcement

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

ble to law enforcement officers acting only under
17 2
the authority of a pen register order.
Digits dialed after the initial connection is
made also include calls placed using a long-distance carrier that offers services accessible by a
toll free number.17 3 The Commission found these

74
numbers to be "call-identifying information."1
The problem lies in the local carrier's inability to
distinguish telephone numbers from bank account numbers once the initial connection has
been made. 175 The local carrier's expense of extracting post-cut-through digits is high enough
without requiring detection and separation of two
kinds of numbers before delivering them to law

enforcement.

76

Other alternatives considered by

the Commission were either even more invasive of
privacy than dialed digit extraction, or considered
too time consuming or inefficient to be feasible. 177 All things considered, the Commission determined that all interests would be served best by
including dialed digit extraction in the technical
capabilities required by CALEA.17 1 In light of the

unfeasibility of the alternatives, this became an allor-nothing standard. To exclude the dialed digit
extraction capability entirely would contravene
the primary mandate of CALEA, which is to preserve law enforcement's ability to carry out properly authorized electronic surveillance in the face
of rapidly changing telecommunications technology. Adopting this dialed digit extraction standard maintains familiar application of the minimization requirement to law enforcement wiretap
applications, leaving individual privacy no worse
off in the context of a legal wiretap than it has
been since 1968.'

79

With respect to packet-mode communications,
See id.
See id.
174 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 119.
175
See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 23.
176
The Commission noted that digit extraction alone
would be more expensive than any other punch list item. See
Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 123.
177
One alternative consisted of law enforcement obtaining full wiretap authority in order to access all post-connection communications. Such authority is, of course, more
difficult to obtain than that required for a pen register, effectively raising the standard of proof required for a pen register order. Another alternative contemplated directing a pen
register order to each carrier with facilities used in a given
172
173

communication by the intercept subject. Even if it was feasible, this alternative would likely result in numerous lengthy
delays as law enforcement established multiple pen registers
at multiple carriers that could easily change from call to call.
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both the petitioners' arguments and the Commission's conclusions are analogous to those made
regarding dialed digit extraction. It is another allor-nothing situation where excluding the capability would be entirely against the driving purpose
of CALEA but requiring distillation of specific information contained within packets would be prohibitively expensive-not to mention a potentially
severe impediment to future industry innovation.
Yet packet-mode communications rapidly are becoming ubiquitous telecommunications technology to be exempted from wiretapping beyond the
short term.18 0 As with dialed digit extraction, the
petitioners argue that the Third Report and Order
gives law enforcement agencies more information
about surveillance subjects than they are authorized to receive-that is, law enforcement receives
information about call content under CALEA but
needs only to obtain a warrant for "call-identifying
information."' 8 1 One difference from dialed digit
extraction is that with packet-mode wiretaps, law
enforcement officers likely will have complete access to voice communications and not just credit
card or bank account numbers.'8 2 A more significant difference (as the technology currently exists) is that, unlike post-cut-through digits in circuit-mode communications, packet-mode call
content is essentially inseparable from "call-identi' 183
fying information."
Because packet-mode communications by design make more efficient use of telecommunications networks than circuit-mode communications, any government-imposed redesign of the
technology to facilitate separation of call-identifying information from content would violate
CALEA's policy against impeding new technologiSee id. at para. 120-22.
178
See id. at para. 123.
179
See discussion supra note 37-38(discussing the minimization requirement of Title III).
180 See EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 4 (referring to

packet-mode networks as an important part of "next-generation telecommunications systems" and a soon-to-be "dominant feature of our telecommunications landscape").
181 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 32.
182
See id. at 35 (stating that the Third Report and Order
"permits law enforcement officials to intercept the contents of
packet communications with nothing more than a pen register authorization"). See also Third Report and Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. at para. 56.
183
See, e.g., Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para.
53 (noting the utter lack of feasibility of separating call con-

tent contained in individual packets from the accompanying
call-identifying information).
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cal development. 184 The Commission readily admitted that it did not have enough information to
make a final determination regarding technical
standards for packet-mode surveillance assistance
capabilities. 1 5 For this reason, and in recognition
of the increasing importance of packet-mode
technologies, the Third Report and Order only established an interim requirement that carriers develop the ability to provide packet-mode communications in their entirety to properly authorized
law enforcement agencies.18 6 It is expected that a
permanent solution may be developed by the telecommunications industry (with the TIA leading
the charge) as early as September 2000.18 7 Peti-

tioners should also take comfort in the Commission's footnote to the Third Report and Order that
points out that many carriers have the ability to
produce records containing only call-identifying
information. Such capability would thus afford
carriers the option of avoiding Fourth Amendment concerns entirely when confronted with a
pen register order. 188 Still, given the sheer number and variety of services already incorporating
packet-mode technologies, in addition to the likelihood that they will continue to evolve and proliferate, privacy issues surrounding the interception
of such communications are unlikely to disappear
89
soon.1
B.

Why the Technical Standards of the Third
Report and Order Should Stand

complaints about FCC mandates that violate Title
III and the Fourth Amendment are interlaced
with pretext and clearly misplaced. Title III directly regulates electronic surveillance conducted
by law enforcement, and not the activities of telecommunications carriers or the FCC.' 90 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment creates individual
rights against certain government searches and
seizures but does not grant telecommunications
carriers any rights to avoid FCC regulations. 9 1
The Third Report and Order, in contrast, purports
to govern neither the duties of law enforcement
nor the enforcement authority of courts. 1 92 It was
intended, pursuant to Congress' statutory command in CALEA, to update in technological terms
a carrier's legal duties under Title III, itself a longtime guide for courts applying Fourth Amendment warrant requirements to wiretaps. 19 3 Exactly
how this update, in an age of widespread technological change, could actually "mandat[e] unconstitutional searches and seizures"' 9 4 or violate
both Title III and the Fourth Amendment is unclear.' 95 The Third Report and Order merely advocates the most efficient and effective application
of CALEA's solutions to recent law enforcement
problems, while the petitioners' proposals would
allow federal wiretap law to be swept away on the
current of market innovation and thus render
CALEA toothless.
The Commission's role under CALEA is to establish technical standards upon petition by a government agency or any other person who believes
that any existing industry standards are defi-

In the end, determining technical standards for
CALEA implementation is fundamentally a matter
of administrative policy rather than law and therefore appropriately within the province of the FCC.
The petitioners' claims of privacy concerns and

tablished by the Commission or within the telecommunications industry, constitute a safe harbor
for compliance with the assistance capability re-

See id. at para. 55 (pointing out this potential dan-

cific responsibility on telecommunications carriers or anyone

184

ger).
185

186

See id.

See id.
See id. at para. 56.
188 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 34; EPIC Brief supra
note 148, at 9. Cf.Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para.
55 n.107. To the contrary, the USTA and EPIC Briefs misconstrue this statement by the Commission as "ignor[ing]" and
"opt[ing] not to pursue this administratively and constitutionally sound alternative."
189 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 51
(adopting AT&T's comment that different packet-mode technologies may require different assistance capability standards).
190 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493. Initially, Title III imposed no spe187

cient. 19

6

Those technical standards, whether es-

else to assist law enforcement officials in effectuating wiretaps. Indeed, that was the primary impetus behind CALEA.
191 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (beginning with an identification of"[t]he right of the people to be secure" as the primary focus of the amendment).
192

See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. I

(stating that it is directed solely at "wireline, cellular, and

broadband [PCS] carriers").
193 See discussion supra note 32(discussing the purposes
of the 1968 Act).
194
EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 17.
195 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 37 (characterizing the
Third Report and Order as expanding "law enforcement's ability to obtain content information" and contravening both the
Fourth Amendment and Title III).
196
See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
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quirements of the Act. 197 As a safe harbor, compliance with those standards is not compulsory but
merely suggested as a means of obtaining voluntary industry compliance with CALEA. 198 For
these reasons, the Third Report and Order does not
actually mandate or require compliance with any
of the technical standards defined therein. Even if
it did somehow carry the weight of a legal mandate, such technological guidelines cannot dictate
the level of proof binding on courts when confronted with an application by law enforcement
for a wiretap order. The legal determination of
the level of proof can only be made by courts
themselves, acting pursuant to Title III, the federal pen register statute or the Fourth Amendment. 19 9 In the event that the order sought does
not exactly fit within the contemplated scope of
these laws, Title III and Fourth Amendment case
law provide factual scenarios to guide courts in
2°
determining the appropriate level of proof.
Therefore, regardless of its language, the Third Report and Orderhas no actual authority to define the
specific levels of proof necessary for certain types
of surveillance.
Because the Commission neither intends to,
nor actually does, redefine types of surveillance
that may occur under existing legal authority, the
petitioners' arguments that the Commission exceeded CALEA, and violated Title III and the
Fourth Amendment are based on a false premise.
With the exception of the civil liberties groups
that joined the appeal, the petitioners' privacy arguments largely seem to be pretext for economic
concerns about the costs of meeting technical
standards in the Third Report and Order.2°1 Not
197

See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (2).

198

See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 26 (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3506. The report of the House Judiciary
Committee stated it best: "[c]ompliance with the industry
standards is voluntary, not compulsory. Carriers can adopt
other solutions for complying with the capability requirements." See id.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d

148, 171 (1st Cir. 1999).
To the extent that Title III is designed to protect privacy
interests similar to those reflected in the Fourth Amendmnent... that statutory purpose was served by the district
court's finding of probable cause to intercept and by the
order's inclusion of other items of particularity, including the identity of the person whose commtnications
were to be intercepted, the nature and location of the

telephone line to be intercepted, a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to

which the communications relate.
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only could compliance raise industry costs
enough to affect subscription rates, but a widespread public perception that the new technical
standards inherently lessen the privacy and security of telecommunications networks could conceivably cause subscribers to lose confidence in
newer services and technologies. Any resulting
loss of subscribers could then theoretically reduce
the expected return on telecommunications carriers' investment in developing new services and
technologies and thus have the potential effect of
chilling technological innovation. 20 2 Yet one way
or another, whether through higher taxes or increased telecommunications service rates, subscribers will end up paying for CALEA. Industry
investments made today ultimately will cost less
than future, forced upgrades and penalties imposed by regulatory or judicial action to ensure
belated industry compliance with the Act. Otherwise, the fact that new technologies so challenged
the traditional functionality of authorized wiretaps as to prompt CALEA's enactment should reassure the true privacy advocates, because there
remain a number of available technologies unaf20 3
fected by the Act.

Regardless of the petitioners' motivations to
challenge CALEA and the Commission's implementation duties under the Act, the courts will
eventually have to address legal questions
prompted by the development of new wiretap
technologies. Only then should Title III and
Fourth Amendment concerns come into play. For
example, the Commission clearly foresaw the possibility that law enforcement will seek only pen
register or trap-and-trace authority to intercept
Id.
See, e.g., id.
See discussion supra note 144 (discussing various estimates of the cost of implementation).
202
See America Rides the Wireless Wave, THE ECONOMIST,
200)
201

Apr. 29, 2000, at 57
This is pure speculation. As a whole, the general public
appears to be oblivious to telephone privacy issues and
to have gained rather than lost confidence in wireless
services. A graph appearing in a recent issue of THE
ECONOMIST shows mobile phone ownership penetration
of all United States households in 1999 at over 30%. The
level exceeded sixty percent in some urban areas.
id.
20-: Two major examples of exempt technologies and services are encrypted or scrambled telecommunications, and
any communication classified as "information services," such
as electronic mail or paging services. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(b)(2)-(3); 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6) (defining "information services" for purposes of CALEA).
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packet-mode communications.20 4 However, there
is no legal authority for such an order. Under the
pen register statute, a court may issue an order
"authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a [trap-and-trace] device." 20 5 A pen register is defined later in the statute as a device attached to a telephone line that identifies the
telephone numbers

dialed. 20

6

Furthermore,

a

trap-and-trace device is defined as identifying the
originating telephone number of an incoming
call. 20

7

With the governing statute expressly lim-

ited in scope to capturing telephone numbers,
courts cannot issue pen register warrants authorizing the interception of packet-mode communications. 2 0

Thus the practical solution to this new

problem is properly left either for the judicial system or Congress to remedy at a future date. The
FCC has fulfilled its statutory duty and only a
change in the statute or in Fourth Amendment
doctrine will drastically alter the Third Report and
Order now.
Just as technological advances prompted
CALEA's enactment, so too will they require continually updated technical standards for compliance with the Act's assistance capability requirements that are designed to conform to the
inherent limitations of the regulated technologies. CALEA does indeed regulate technology by
requiring that certain capabilities be built into law
enforcement assistance capabilities. In doing so,
however, the statute does not attempt to limit the
state of the art but aims merely to keep up with it.
It is certainly not desirable in a free market society
for the future of technological innovation to be
determined by legally mandated design features,
but neither should the effective operation of the
law in a nation built on laws be threatened by future technological change.2 0 9 Instead, there must
be compromises enabling technology and the law
to evolve together. Thus Congress conceived the
underlying design of CALEA-to provide advance
204
205

206
207
208

See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 56.
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).

See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the Third

Report and Order's treatment of the FBI Punch List items). Despite any implications of the Third Report and Orderto the contrary, there is no provision in CALEA that equates "call-iden-

tifying information" with information accessible pursuant to
a pen register order. Given the Commission's inclusion of
such punch list items as party hold, join and drop on conference calls, and in-band and out-of-band signaling within the

notice to the telecommunications industry of the
types of law enforcement assistance functionality
that it will be required to build into its new service
offerings to the public.
There are effectively three parties upon whom
the assistance capability provisions of CALEA impose duties: the telecommunications industry, law
enforcement agencies and the FCC. The industry
had the initial responsibility for developing technical standards that met the Act's statutory requirements. Law enforcement agencies were
handed the task of identifying problems, both
with existing technology and the technical standards proposed by industry for CALEA compliance. Finally, in the event of a dispute over implementation between law enforcement agencies and
the telecommunications industry, the FCC was
chosen as the referee. The telecommunications
industry understandably wanted to minimize the
cost of implementation and thus proposed standards that required as few changes as possible to
existing facilities. Law enforcement agencies, of
course, hoped to take advantage of the benefits of
technology, both to overcome technical surveillance difficulties that they faced with newer telecommunications services and to expand their
2 10
overall electronic surveillance capabilities.
Armed with telecommunications expertise but
having scant experience with the law governing
searches and seizures, the FCC was thrust into the
unfortunate position of balancing these often
competing interests as directed by the statute. At
the same time, it had to provide telecommunications industry participants clear notice of exactly
what would be required of them in terms specific
enough to ensure their compliance. This is precisely what the Commission did-as best it could
given the limitations of both the law and the existing technology-because Congress had decided
that "somebody" had to do it. If anything, more
deference should be given to the wiretap laws in
scope of "call-identifying information," it is evidently a much
broader concept than just the initial telephone number dialed. See id.
209
For an in-depth discussion of the operability of the
"law of cyberspace" as a teacher of narrow tailoring in regulatory design and other issues presented by the interplay between law and technology, see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501
(1999).
210
Thus the FBI must define standards in addition to
those minimally adopted by industry or risk having its wiretap
authority preempted by changes in technology.
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analyzing these issues than to technology in recognition of the exponentially longer amount of time
that it has traditionally taken for the law to
change. Technology, by nature, has always had
the advantage in the arena of privacy creation-if
2 11
not by design then by virtue of its mystery.
The Third Report and Ordershould stand because
it does not directly violate any constitutional
rights. The report's five-year gestation period,
complete with ample industry participation,
should quash any notions that the Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously. It implements a remarkable (if imperfect) attempt at harmonizing
the accelerating evolution of law and technology
in the wiretap context. While it should be expected that, over time, certain standards will need
refinement, short-term competitive barriers to implementation have dropped significantly. In a single stroke, the FCC provided the telecommunications industry with the external impetus necessary
for CALEA implementation that was previously
lacking and trivialized the industry's earlier fears
that action not taken by the entire industry might
competitively disadvantage the individual actor.
Congress used the Commission's rulemaking authority as a check to balance the competing interests of progress and public safety, each represented on behalf of the general public by the
telecommunications industry and law enforcement. The Commission should not relinquish this
hard won anchor point for the implementation of
CALEA, lest the growing rift between telecommunications technology and the law become impassable.
V.

CONCLUSION

The technical standards contained in the FCC's
Third Report and Order, In Re the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"),
begin to effectively implement the assistance capability requirements of the Act as envisioned by
Congress. The Commission's proper exercise of
its rulemaking authority under CALEA should
211
As noted above, CALEA would not have been necessary were it not for the de facto privacy created by the in-
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overcome the telecommunications industry's reluctance to comply with all law enforcement requests for additional features in electronic surveillance. This result was warranted by statutory
design without contravention of either Title III or
the Fourth Amendment, because the capability
standards constitute a safe harbor for compliance
with the Act and not a determination of the appropriate level of proof required for authorization of certain types of electronic surveillance. Although the Third Report and Order highlights
questions for courts regarding such requirements
for the legal authorization of certain new types of
interceptions, the preservation of CALEA's integrity demands that these issues must be viewed as a
result not of the Commission's rulemaking but of
the limitations inherent in some new telecommunications technologies.
For all of the above reasons, the Third Report
and Ordershould be upheld. Collaterally, telecommunications carriers should embrace (sooner
rather than later) upgrades to their facilities that
bring them into compliance with CALEA's new
technical standards in order to avoid penalties
and the potentially high cost of independently
marketed upgrade packages. Congress, federal
law enforcement agencies and the FCC all have
responded to the lack of industry initiative that
compelled enactment of CALEA. The government has now mandated the incorporation of specific capabilities for making effective, legal wiretaps into the designs of current and future
telecommunications technology and services. Industry participants should welcome this opportunity to maintain proprietary control over both the
enabling and the limitation of wiretap capabilities
in their own facilities. From a forward-looking economic perspective, such control appears preferable either to forcing telecommunications carriers
to pay for piecemeal upgrades in the event of future wiretap orders or to having the government
dictate new detailed technical capability standards
every time telecommunications technology takes
another step forward.

creasingly numerous, complicated and cryptic electronic signals that now comprise telecommunications.

